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THE USE OF THE INJUNCTION TO PREVENT CRIME.*
I
A COURT OF EQUITY IS NOT A COURT OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
(a)
A court of equity at one time is said to have had some
crimial jurisdiction. The circumstances under winch it claimed
tins jurisdiction and the nature of the development and subse-
quent loss of it are so involved in the historical growth of the
law that it is necessary to give a brief prelimnnary sketch of the
development of the court of Chancery in order to properly
understand the situation.
History itself is so all-inclusive that to break the whole at
any one point for such a brief digression, as tns necessarily must
be, is to emphasize the more its continuity and inseparability
To begin with, we find' that the principles of the common
law are founded upon reason and equality and in the course of
its formation it was flexible and extended not only to cases
expressly provided for but winch were within the spirit of the
existing law. In the course of time however, precedents were
established winch were considered binding by succeeding judges.
Hence, the common law became, to a great extent, a lex scripta,
positive and inflexible so that the rule of justice could not be
applied to every case according to right and justice.
And thus it was that the necessity of the court of equity
was brought about, I. e., to supplement the law. There was first
the direct appeal to the King for justice winch was later taken
over by the King-m-Council. And from these original concep-
tions the Court of Chancery developed. Let it be understood
howevei, that there was no set jurisdiction for each court for
"no sharp line was drawn between executive and judicial
powers, and Chancellors, probably without stopping to analyze
in what capacity, exercised the royal prerogative delegated to
* This is the fifth of a series of notes to be published under the
same general heading.
" Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Vol. II, p. 219.
The History of the Court of Chancery, by Spence.
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them by Edward III to relieve the poor and the weak. Thus
many of the suits of tins period though involving property
rights, in fact were instituted to preserve thepeaee and prevent
crime."2 This confusion as to the respective jurisdictions of
the courts is discussed in a comparatively recent case.3 "In
the earlier periods the jurisdiction (of equity) was ill-defined,
and was in some respects even much more extensive than it after-
wards became when the relations between it and the common
law tribunals were finally adjusted." Walsh 4 states that equity
ceased to be part of the common law about the middle of the
fourteenth century
As the court of equity was created to give relief where the
common law became too formal to mete out justice so the crimnal
jurisdiction of equity was created to give relief where the
criminal administration was too weak or corrupt to function
properly It was during the reign of Richard II that the made-
quacy of the criminal administration became apparent. 5 "In
the reign of Richard II the unsettled state of the country tended
to encourage every sort of violence, the necessity for more than
ordinary means of protection from oppressions and spoilation
was obvious. '"6 "Tis (criminal jurisdiction), was clhefly due
to the troublesome times, the disturbed condition of the country,
while violence and oppression everywhere prevailed, and the
ordinary courts could give but little protection to the poor and
the weak, when the powerful landowners were constantly invad-
ing the rights of their inferiors and overawing the local magis-
trates. In the reign of Richard II, the Chancellor actually exer-
cised some crimial jurisdiction to repress violence and restrain
the lawlessness of the great against the poor and helpless.
' IT
Thus it is seen that the jurisdiction was created in an era
of lawlessness to meet an urgent need for the protection of the
weak against the inroads of the strong. The court of Star
Chamber took over practically all of the criminal jurisdiction of
the Court of Chancery and from this time the jurisdiction
216 Harvard Law Review 389.
3 Stuart v. La Safle County, 83 Ill. 341 (1876).
4 A Treatise on Equity, Walsh, Sec. 2, pp. 2-11.
0 tuart v. La Sane County, supra, note 3.
6 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Vol. II, p. 241,
supra, note L
"Stuart v. La Safle County, supra, note 3.
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remained in the Star Chamber where it died with the Court itself
in 1645.8
The exact status and effect of the Court of Star Chamber is
somewhat confused by the writers upon the subject. Chafee 9
states that, "This criminal jurisdiction (of equity) became
obsolescent with the rise of the Star Chamber." However,
Speneeio states that, "The (crininal) jurisdiction (of the Star
Chamber) arose almost concurrently with the establishment of
the Court of Chancery and entirely analagous in principle and
procedure to that Court but confining its jurisdiction to cases
partaking of a criminal nature."
Tis question as to the time of the creation of the Star
Chamber is more or less beside the question however, when we
consider that they may both be deemed courts of equity "'
It may be said then that the two courts grew together, the
court of equity developing into its present status and the court
of Star Chamber taking to itself the criminal jurisdiction.
12
The coordinate nature of these courts is illustrated by
Jenks.13 "The procedure of the court of Chancery resembled
that of the Court of Star Chamber almost as completely as it
differed from that of the law courts. So striking, indeed, is
the resemblance, that the Star Chamber is sometimes called a
'court of criminal equity', and suggestions of a common origin
are frequently met with."
The criminal jurisdiction of the Star Chamber made it a
center of litigation for a time, it "soon became an active center
8 Statute 16 Car. I, c. 10.
'Cases on Equitable Relief Against Torts, 438, Chafee.
10 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Vol. II, p. 219,
supra, note 1.
1 "Twin sisters they (the Star Chamber and the court of equity)
were; indeed, in the 14th century it is hard to tell one from the other,
and even in the Stuart time we sometimes find the Star Chamber
doing things which we would have expected to be done by the Chan-
cery." A Sketch of English Legal History, Maitland and Montague,
p. 120.
2"The jurisdiction of the court of Star Chamber was founded
upon the inefficiency of the ordinary tribunals to do complete justice
in criminal matters, and other offenses of an extraordinary and
dangerous character. This jurisdiction arose almost concurrently with
the establishment of the court of chancery and entirely analagous in
principle and procedure to that court but confining its jurisdiction to
cases partaking of a criminal nature." Select Essays in Anglo-Amer.
ican Legal History, Vol. II, p. 219, supra, note 1.
"sShort History of English Law, p. 146, Jenks.
K. L. J.-6
KENTUCKy LAw JOutMAL
of criminal prosecutions for libel. "14 It was actually needed
under the circumstances and was useful m aid to the poor and
oppressed.15
However, the Court of the Star Chamber was to end. Two
factors brought about its destruction. (1) advancing civilization
and (2) its own arbitrary methods. In the first place it was
brought into existence as an emergency during a time of turmoil
and strife, and when this passed the necessity for criminal equity
passed.16 Its methods also became very oppressive, and it soon
became odious to the people who no longer needed it for protee-
tion.lr 1fack s states that the Star Chamber was abolished m
1645 while Jenks19 claims that it was abolished by the Long
Parliament m 1641.
To sum up, equity once had criminal jurisdiction wich it
acquired because of the turbulent state of affairs at that time.
It relinquished this jurisdiction to the Star Chamber (or per-
haps the Star Chamber developed this jurisdiction as the two
courts grew together) and when the need for the extraordinary
jurisdiction no longer existed and the methods of the Star
Chamber became oppressive it was abolished in 1645 (or 1641)
and presumably the criminal jurisdiction with it. This is what
is to be gathered from an historical investigation. It is now
necessary to investigate the authorities upon the subject since
that time.
(b)
It has been shown that equity was deprived of crimial
jurisdiction near the middle of the seventeenth century It is
the aim of section (b) to show that the court does not at thd
present time have such jurisdiction.
4 Short History of English Law, Jenks, p. 146.
2 "Meanwhile the court of Star Chamber, its actual constitution
varying from reign to reign, does a great deal of justice, for the more
part criminal justice, and this in a summary administrative way."
A Sketch of English Legal History, supra, note 11.
1 "But when the state of society became more quiet and orderly,
this 3urisdiction was abandoned, .and has never been claimed or exer-
cised." Stuart v. La Salle County, supra, note 3.
", "Its (the StarChamber's) summary methods applied to the trial
of crimes eventually became so arbitrary and tyrannical, and the court
became so odious that it was abolished by statute in 1645." 16 Harvard
Law Review, supra, note 2.
18 Ibid.
2' Short History of English Law, Jenks, p. 166.
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No spirit of conservatism or liberalism is consciously instilled
into this note, yet it is necessarily conservative, in a sense, in
that its province is to state the law as it stands, without regard
as to future developments or extensions. With this idea in mind
we first look to Lord Eldon, who was a staunch exponent of
precedent in the law as opposed to expansion and change. In
the celebrated case of Gee v Pritchard20 he said, "The publica-
tion of a libel is a crime, and I have no jurisdiction to prevent
the commission of crimes."
Recently, writers in legal periodicals have been so positive
that the position of Lord Eldon was correct that one finds such
terse statements as the following "It is, of course, a common-
place of modern law that equity cannot enjoin crime.'" 2 1
The Earl of Halsbury in his comprehensive work upon the
laws of England22 stated that equity did not have jurisdiction
to prevent the commission of acts which were merely crinnal
or illegal.
Lord Justice Turner in two cases 23 about the middle of t4e
nineteenth century stated that equity could not be called upon
to interfere upon the ground of any criminal offense committed,
or for the purpose of giving a better remedy in the case of such
an offense.
Turning to the American authorities, one finds the same
doctrine set forth. In the case of Attorney General v. The Uttea
Insurance 00.24 an information was filed by the Attorney Gen-
eral, to redress and restrain, by injunction, the usurpation of a
franchise, which if true, amounted to a breach of law, and of
public policy The injunction was refused on the grounds that
the court did not have jurisdiction of an offense against a public
statute, or of a criminal matter. The Court said, "If a charge
be of a criminal nature, or an offense against the public, it ought
not to be brought within the direct jurisdiction of this court,
2*Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402 (1812). Note: It may be men-
tioned that there has been some controversy as to whether Lord Eldon
was in fact a conservative or a progressive, but the better authority
seems to support the former view.
2128 Michigan Law Review 441.
OThe Laws of England, Vol. 17, Injunctions, p. 205, See. 457.
"Attorney General v. Sheffiee Gas Consumers Co., 3 De G. M. & G.
304 at 320 (1852), and The Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 De G. F & J.
277 at 253 (1861).
2- Attorney General v. The Utica Insurance Co., 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.)
371 (1817).
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which was intended to deal only in matters of civil right resting
in equity, or where the remedy at law was not sufciently ade-
quate. The charge is too much of the nature of a mis-
demeanor to belong to this court." Similarly in -People v.
Prouty,25 Prouty had been found guilty of contempt for violat-
ing a decree of divorce against hin which forbade either party
to marry again within the time prohibited by the Illinois statute.
On appeal, Prouty was discharged. The sole purpose of the
degree forbidding the defendent to marry again within the year
was to prevent violation of this penal statute. The court held
that the decree forbidding such marriage was absolutely void as
the trial court had no such power to enjoin an act merely because
it would be a crime.
In Commonwealth v Smith2 6 an injunction was sought
against the commissioners of the Fairmount Park to compel them
to rescind a resolution permitting games on Sundays, under an
old statute of 1794 which forbade public games on Sundays. The
court dismissed as immaterial whether not such games were
technical violations of the statute and therefore crimes. It was
found as a fact that the playing of such games did not constitute
a nuisance public or private. The court refused an injunction
against such games merely because they were crimes, saying,
"It is well settled that a bill will not lie having for its sole pur-
pose an injunction against the mere commission of a crime as is
the case here."
In Sparhawk v The Unon Passenger Railway CoY an
injunction was asked t6 prevent the defendant Railway Co. from
running on Sunday The injunction was refused because this
was a bill by a private person to enforce a penal statute n!
equity The court said, "If it be supposed that because an act
is illegal merely, equity will interfere to restrain it, it is a nis-
apprehension of equity jurisdiction. The penal law that is
violated is provided with the machinery for punishment and to it
the violation must be referred. One reason why equity can not
interfere is that there is a remedy at law by statute, and we must
presume it adequate for it is what the law has provided and no
more." From these cases it may be taken as an established
5People v. Prouty, 262 Ill. 218, 104 N. E. 387 (1914).
Commonwealth v. Smith, 266 Pa. 511, 109 AtI. 786 (1920).
Sparhawkc v. The Union Passenger Railway Co., 54 Penn. St. 401
(1867).
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principle of the law that equity does not have crininal jurisdic-
tion.
However, Mack states three classes of situations in which,
he clains. the jurisdiction of equity has been extended beyond
the limit set down in the above cases.
2
8
(1) Cases involving the preservation of the peace or the
prevention of concerted action to injure property, I. e., labor con-
troversies, where courts have assumed jurisdiction to restrain
acts intended to ccerce the employers by preventing workers from
taking the place of strikers. The basis of such jurisdiction has
been the prevention of irreparable damage for which there is no
adequate remedy at law.
(2) Prevention of violation of public decency, I. e., saloons
and brothels. The jurisdiction has been based on public nui-
sance, impairment of the value of adjoning property and in
some cases a theory of public welfare has been propounded.
(3) Protection of public from combinations in restraint of
trade. This class of cases is analagous to that concerning the
powerful barons of the time of Richard II. A Georgia court
held that the state could enjoin not only when property rights
were involved but where public interests were threatened or
jeopardized.
2 9
Clark 30 discusses this seemingly extraordinary jurisdiction.
Because an act is a crime does not prevent equity from taking
jurisdiction if there are other well-recognized grounds for the
jurisdiction. "Within recent years this branch of equity has
grown considerably, especially in cases involving labor disputes,
violations of public decency or combinations in restraint of
trade." This resembles the history of the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries in that one reason for the frequent calls for
equitable interference in such cases has been the inefficiency of
the adminstration of the crimnal law. This inefficiency is due
it is said to some extent to an elective judiciary and prosecuting
officers and to the small power which courts exercise in the trial
of criminal cases. There is now a popular outcry against such
jurisdiction, even as there was in earlier times. This is true
especially in labor controversies, because of the feeling that such
2116 Harvard Law Review 389, supra, note 2.
21See 30 Har. Law Rev. 857, upon these cases concerning large
corporations.
3OPrinciples of Equity, Clark, Sec. 244, p. 322.
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interference favors the cause of the employer against the
employee and because of the usual distrust and fear of one-man
power. As a result there has been in some states legislation
restricting the giving of injunctions in certain classes of cases
where the acts sought to be enjoined are crnnes.
3 1
The public opposition to this extension of equity has not
been analyzed by the ones opposing it but it is based upon the
feeling that traditional safeguards axe being encroached upon.
The argument has been advanced that the jurisdiction is uncon-
stitutional but this argument is repudiated by the majority of
cases.3 2 However, this feeling could be based upon certain
fundamental documents of the English law, where we find such
statements as this "No free-man shall be taken or imprisoned
or any ways destroyed, nor will we pass upon him, nor will we
send upon him, unless by lawful judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land."' 33 However, the courts have not found, for
one reason or another, that any fundamental rights of the people
are generally violated by the use of the jurisdiction as it is now
administered.
Mack, in his article, supra, opposes the extension of equity
jurisdiction in this field, feeling that if the criminal courts were
made to rely upon their own processes alone to enforce the crimi-
nal law they would in time become adequate for the purpose and
at the same time equity would not be burdened with the danger
of arousing popular opposition to its procedure by its enforce-
ment of the crininal law. This position seems impractical
because, granting that the criminal courts would eventually
reform so as to produce an adequate remedy in all cases, the
process would necessarily be so slow that the injury to the public
would outweigh the injury to the equity court through popular
opposition.
The fear that the equity court will extend its jurisdiction
to unreasonable limits is groundless as long as equity takes juris-
*1 Note: See 16 Har. Law Rev. 402-404, favoring such legislation
and 7 Col. Law Rev. 357-359, favoring the jurisdiction.
- "A man charged with the commission of a crime has a constitu-
tional right to a trial by jury, but a man who has not yet acted, but
who merely proposes to commit an act, which is not only criminal
in its character, but also flagrantly offensive as a public nuisance, has
no constitutional right to commit the act, in order that he may there-
after enjoy the constitutional right of trial by jury." State v. Caretz,
207 Mo. 439, 105 S. W 1078 (1907).
i3Magna Charta, Sec. 39.
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diction only in cases where a legitimate equitable ground for
jurisdiction exists. For instance, a court of equity will enjoin
the criminal intinudation of working men. in order to protect
the property interests of the employers.3 4 Similarly, the court
will enjoin strikers from committing criminal acts of violence.8 5
And likewise it will restrain a criminal conspiracy of any num-
ber of people to injure property 36 These applications of the
rule are in accordance with well-established equitable principles.
In conclusion, it may be said that the opposition to the exer-
cise of equity jurisdiction in cases analagous to those mentioned
by Mfack 3 7 is the opposition of a small minority who place their
objections upon the ground that equity is exercising criminal
jurisdiction, because they do not understand the situation. There
is a distinction to be drawn between the criminal jurisdiction of
equity during the. reign of Richard II and the present "exten-
sions" of equity jurisdiction. At the earlier period crimes
were enjoined as such and with this power a court of equity had
almost unlimited power to become tyrannical if it so desired. At
the present time there is no pretense of enjoining crinminal acts
as such, in every case there is a legitimate ground for equity
jurisdiction. Under such conditions a court of equity could not
become tyrannical, even if the present state of civilization would
allow it.
Since this note is only a part of a more comprehensive study
upon the subject, its province is only to show the historical
development of criminal jurisdiction in a court of equity and to
state whether or not a court of equity is, at the present time, a
court of criminal jurisdiction. In section (a) it was shown that
equity once had crnminal jurisdiction but subsequently lost it.
In section (b), upon an examination of the authorities, it has
been found that a court of equity is not at the present time a
court of criminal jurisdiction.3 8
1'Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 35 L. R. A. 722 (1896), Jones
v. Van Winkle Gin and Machine Works, 62 S. E. 236, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.)
848 (1908).
5Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 46
Atl. 208, 59 N. J. Eq. 49 (1899).
'Arther v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310, 25 L. R. A. 414 (1894).
1 16 Har. Law Rev., supra, note 2.
"'Note: With this conclusion it should be remembered that it was
also found from the cases and authorities examined that the fact that
an act was criminal did not deprive equity of jurisdiction if there was
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Tm FACT TiAT THE LAW IS NOT ENFORCED IN THE CRIMINAL
COURTS IS NOT A GROUND FOR TE INTERPOSITION OF EQUITY.
Much has been said concerning equity taking jurisdiction
where the remedy at law is inadequate. Perhaps there is some
confusion as to the exact meaning of 'inadequacy' as it is here
used. It has to do with the actual remedy and not with the
operatwn of the law. The remedy may be entirely adequate
where there is at the same time no action because of the failure
of the proper officers to perform their duties. For instance, A,
might openly and notoriously operate a saloon and not be prose-
cuted because of lack of enforcement in the community Here
A, Iwould go free but the remedy at law would probably be
entirely adequate. The manner in which the prosecution
operates in a criminal case has nothing whatever to do with the
adequacy of the remedy
In early times the Chancellor assumed jurisdiction, it is
true, because there would not be proper prosecution where the
defendant's power was so great that he could not or would not
be punished by a court of law for committing a threatened
offense. However, this jurisdiction has long been obsolete.
(Supra, section I, a.)
We see an exception to the general rule in a Georgia case. 39
The court said "This indictment would necessarily be against
the city officers or those who act under them, and in all probabil-
ity the influence and moral integrity of those gentlemen, which
would necessarily be brought to bear against a criminal proceed-
ing, would more than likely protect them from a conviction as
criminals." This is not an authoritative statement of an exist-
ing principle of equity jurisdiction. It is not to be presumed
that a court of law will fail to administer justice in cases within
its jurisdiction, or that any department of the government will
fail in the performance of its duties. The probability of such a
failure cannot afford a ground for assuming jurisdiction in
a legitimate equitable ground for taking such jurisdiction. A more
complete dscussion of this latter class of cases will be found in other
sections of this article.
'Mayor, Etc., of Coumbus v. Jacques, 30 Ga. 506 (1860).
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equity Such a doctrine would be contrary to any rational con-
ception of the relations of the judiciary to other departments
of the government, or of the distinction between law and equity
The true doctrine is set forth in the case of State v. Patter-
son.4 0 In this case the state of Texas brought a bill against
Ben NL Patterson and others to abate by injunction the keeping
of a public gambling house. The court refused to enjoin because
there was no injury to property or civil rights. The fact that
the law was not enforced did not give equity jurisdiction. Said
the court, "That the law against tins offense is not enforced and
observed is no ground for the interposition of a court of equity,
for, as has been observed, such a court has no jurisdiction to
restrain the comnnssion of a crime nor enforce moral obligations
or the performance of moral duties as such, nor can it rightfully
interfere with the performance of an illegal act merely because
it is illegal, m the absence of an injury to property or civil
rights."
In People ex rel. L'Abbe v. District Court41 Mary Hender-
son, president of the Leadville W C. T. U., instituted a suit to
enjoin defendants from gambling m the city of Leadville.
Defendants sued out a writ of prohibition to restrain the court
from proceeding -with the suit, winch writ was issued. In the
original petition it was alleged that the officers refused to admin-
ister the criminal law. As to this question the court said, "It
is a plain attempt, through the aid of a court of equity to prevent
the violation of a penal statute of the state, and to confer upon
that court the administration of the criminal law, solely because
the sworn officers neglect or refuse to perform their duty in tins
regard. The failure of these officers to perform their duty con-
stitutes no ground for the interference of a court of equity "
However, cases have arisen 42 where crime was suppressed by
equity where the prosecution at law was ineffective (1) con-
solidation of railroad lines, mergers, etc., and (2) the Sherman
Act. The courts base the jurisdiction here not only on property
rights but where "'publie interests are threatened and jeopard-
ized." It will be seen though that these cases involve inade-
quacy of remedy rather than laxity of enforcement.
4State v. Patterson, 14 Tex. Crim. App. 465, 37 S. W 478 (1896).
4People ex reZ. L'Abbe v. Distrct Court, 46 L. R. A. 850 (1899).
4216 Harvard Law Review 397.
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Clark4" states that the inefficiency of the admnistration of
the crinnal law has called for equitable interference and cites
the case of Stead v Fortner 4 Upon this theory we must recog-
nize the fact that criminal prosecution generally is becoming
lax which it is not believed is true. There may be isolated
instances where the prosecution does not for various reasons
operate but in these cases the remedy is elsewhere than by shift-
jng the burden to the court of equity
If the existing law is the will of the community the com-
munity will elect prosecuting officers who will carry out the law.
If it is not the will of the community, it should not be the law
and it matters not if the duly elected officers do not prosecute
as they are supposed to do.
In thirty-eight states "Red light injunction and abatement
acts" 45 have been passed for the abatement of disorderly
houses. 40 These laws are due to the inadequacy of criminal
prosecutions and are designed to protect public health and
morals rather than to protect property There is some reaction
against such legislation and some cases47 have held it unconsti-
tutional.
It has been said that under the present fusion of law and
equity the court should be allowed to administer the means
(damages or injunction) that will to the best advantage render
justice, regardless of the existence or non-existence of the othbr-
remedy 48 To concede the court this wide discretion would be
to open the doors to the exercise of power which might lead to
great abuse and which would certainly meet with great popular
disapproval.
In Stead v Fort-ner4 9 the bill alleged that on April 7, 1908,
3 Principles of Equity, Clark, See. 244, p. 322, supra, note 30.
*'Stead v. Fortner, 99 N. E. 680 (1912).
4 Kentucky Statutes, 1918, Sec. 3941m.
1 20 Columbia Law Review 605.4'Hecden v. Hand, 107 Atl. 285 (1919).
41 "Our single court of law is like a workman with numerous tools
lying before him. For some tasks we may want to use either the hard
blows of the action for damages or the flexible injunction, according
to the circumstances. For other jobs, like the suppression of battery,
the injunction is wholly unfitted, and only damages or prosecution will
serve. As it is the function of a factory to produce goods, so
/it is the function of the courts to produce justice, and they should
feel free to use for that object all or any of the means which long
custom and legislation have placed at their disposal." 75 University
of Penn. Law Review 34.
4
9 Supra, note 44.
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Shelbyville township voted to become anti-saloon territory, and
two weeks later the city of Shelbyville also voted dry, on April 7,
1910, Shelbyville towushlp voted wet but the city took no vote.
On May 9, 1910, the city council passed a license ordinance and
under it defendant Fortner sold liquor. The city authorities
refused to interfere. The Attorney General and the States
Attorney of Shelby county asked for an injunction. In holding
that the demurrer to the bill was properly overruled the court
said, "If ordinary methods are ineffective or officials disregard
their duties and refuse to perform them, the court ought to
apply the strong and effective hand of equity and uproot the
evil." Although this is strong language, the jurisdiction here
seems in reality to be based (1) upon nuisance while (2) as a
practical matter the criminal courts refuse to enforce the law
It may be mention-ed that tins case goes further in that no prop-
erty right was necessary here.
The weight of authority is with the case of Powers v Plan-
burg. 0  Here a bill was filed to enjoin the defendants from
operating a pool room, selling intoxicating liquors contrary to
law and maintaining a disorderly house. The court held,
"There is nothing in the petition or evidence to indicate that
the criminal laws of this state are in any respect insufficient to
punish the defendant and put a stop to the crimes. If
the proper officers refuse or neglect to enforce the law a remedy
is provided other than by injunction."
So the rule should remain. A court of equity is no reposi-
tory for every evil that besets mankind. The fact that equity
supplements the law does not indicate that every one who feels
that he has not received justice for any cause whatsoever should
come to equity as a matter of course. Once the crimnal law is
n effect, there are too many adequate means of having it
enforced to come to an already overcrowded court of equity for
the reason that prosecuting officers have not performed their
duties. Equity should operate within equity jurisdiction and
not endeavor to provide a remedy for every Injustice that may
occur.
Although a court of equity may, under certain circum-
stances acquire a measure of criminal jurisdiction, it does not
acquire jurisdiction through lack of enforcement in the criminal
courts. JAmEs C. Ly =,
Lexington, Ky.
5Powers v. Flanburg, 133 N. W 844 (1911).
